John Bishop, BELIEVING BY FAITH: AN ESSAY IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF by Sweetman, Brendan
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 26 Issue 4 Article 12 
10-1-2009 
Bishop, BELIEVING BY FAITH: AN ESSAY IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
Brendan Sweetman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Sweetman, Brendan (2009) "Bishop, BELIEVING BY FAITH: AN ESSAY IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: 
Vol. 26 : Iss. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss4/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 467
separated from other islands by gigantic oceans of grotesque deformity.”4 
How can one viable creature be gradually transformed into another, since 
most changes are lethal and any that are not cannot be coordinated by top-
down design? The best source of empirical data, human interaction with 
malaria, is not encouraging. As Michael Behe documents in The Edge of 
Evolution, most humans have achieved resistance to malaria by a mutation 
that deforms hemoglobin and which may lead to sickle-cell anemia, not 
by the development of a more sophisticated immune system. And there 
is increasing evidence from developmental biology that DNA mutation 
cannot explain macroevolution. For example, Newman and Müller argue 
that the organization of body plans cannot be explained purely by genes 
because “phenotypic outcomes persist despite extensive derangement in 
lines of ‘program code.’” They claim that “neo-Darwinism has no theory of 
the generative. As a consequence, current evolutionary theory can predict 
what will be maintained, but not what will appear.”5 Epigenetic factors—
factors outside of genes—are increasingly recognized as dominant in de-
velopment, and it is these that must change to produce new body plans.
Other chapters include recent speculations on the origin of life (chap. 3) 
and human evolution (chap. 7), and the impact of Darwinism on philoso-
phy (especially epistemology and ethics), literature and religion (chaps. 
10–12). And there are two admirably self-critical chapters on whether any 
of this is really true (chaps. 8 and 9). Ruse admits that some of the standard 
evidence for Darwinism is not as strong as some claim, but this, combined 
with his positive arguments, only makes his case more credible. Although 
this reviewer has indicated areas of skepticism, he is happy to recommend 
Ruse’s book as one of the strongest recent defenses of Darwinism.
4Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Evolution 
(New York: Mariner Books, 2005), p. 445.
5Gerd B. Müller and Stuart A. Newman, Origination of Organismal Form (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 ), pp. 6–7. 
Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief, 
by John Bishop. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 250, $65.00.
BRENDAN SWEETMAN, Rockhurst University
This book addresses “a core issue in the epistemology of religious belief,” 
the question of whether or not religious beliefs are epistemically justified, 
by attempting to progress beyond what the author regards as the current 
standoff between theists and atheists. Bishop takes seriously what he calls 
the “evidential ambiguity” that leaves open the question of God’s exis-
tence, and responds by offering us a meticulously developed, indeed in-
triguing, modest form of fideism, inspired by the views of William James. 
Although the argument of the book is detailed and quite technical (per-
haps unnecessarily so for what the book ultimately says), Bishop provides 
plenty of summary comment and a comprehensive glossary to aid readers 
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as he unfolds his carefully thought out, well-nuanced thesis. He acknowl-
edges that fideism is currently unpopular, yet his attempt to rehabilitate 
it here, though admirable and very well informed, may still, I believe, be 
open to serious questions.
Bishop begins by drawing our attention to a number of points he thinks 
philosophers of religion have not fully appreciated. One concerns the dis-
tinction between a belief-state of holding a proposition to be true, and the 
action of taking it to be true in practical reasoning (the latter includes mental 
actions of practical commitment to the truth of what is believed). A second 
concerns the fact that the question of the justifiability of taking a religious 
belief to be true in one’s practical reasoning is ultimately a moral question, 
since religious beliefs influence morally significant actions. This point leads 
to a key question: is it true that practical commitment to the truth of a reli-
gious claim is morally justifiable only if its truth is sufficiently supported 
by the agent’s total available evidence—i.e., does moral justification require 
epistemic justification, especially with regard to religious beliefs (p. x)?
The “standard answer” to this question is “yes,” on the grounds that 
we should not act on a belief, at least in the area of worldviews, unless we 
commit to the truth of the belief, and so we must focus on epistemic rea-
sons, not moral ones, for if a belief is epistemically justified, we generally 
cannot help acting on it. Bishop rejects this approach (chap. 2), whatever 
account we may ultimately come to give of epistemic justification, inter-
nalist or externalist. His chief objection is that its proponents do not ap-
preciate that the justification of religious belief is mainly a question about 
the moral justifiability of taking those beliefs to be true in one’s practical 
reasoning (p. 33). His main argument for this claim is that it is possible to 
hold a belief but not act on it, and also possible to act on a belief but not 
be committed to its truth (even though these would not be typical cases 
because holding a belief and so taking it to be true in practical reasoning is 
usually automatic, in the sense of being habituated). Bishop believes that 
“we may be disposed to take a proposition to be true in our [practical] rea-
soning without that disposition counting as a case of holding it to be true” 
(p. 39). This is one of the crucial theses of the book, because the author 
needs it to argue that what a person takes to be true in reasoning is some-
times under the agent’s “direct control,” as opposed to the standard view 
which says that the beliefs we hold and therefore act on are only under 
our “indirect control” (e.g., we can “decide” to examine the evidence on 
a question, but then we should follow it wherever it leads). Bishop wants 
to argue that because we have direct control over what we take to be true, 
we therefore bear moral responsibility for what we take to be true, so our 
taking certain propositions to be true in practical reasoning is subject to 
moral evaluation, and not just epistemic evaluation (p. 44). If all this were 
the case, it would mean that “philosophy of religion should not ultimately 
focus on the epistemic status of religious beliefs, but rather on the moral 
status of practical commitment to the truth of those beliefs” (p. 48).
In his attempt to show that we have more direct control over what we 
take to be true, Bishop seems occasionally to confuse cases in which a 
person holds that p but does not take p to be true in practical reasoning, 
with cases where a person takes a proposition to be true in practical rea-
soning without actually holding that p is true. Examples of the former are 
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commonplace and uncontroversial, such as Bishop’s example of believ-
ing, but not acting, on medical advice. But the few examples he offers to 
support the latter case are not convincing. He cites cases of pretending to 
believe (that the fugitive is not at my house when it is being searched, for 
example); yet in these cases, since I am pretending, it is not a true case of 
not believing, and yet acting, on the belief. The other example he offers is 
that we might treat a proposition as an assumption or a working hypoth-
esis; yet the problem here is that our practical reasoning in accord with it 
is conditional, since the hypothesis is subject to confirmation or disconfir-
mation. His failure to convincingly establish this thesis is a problem for 
his later argument that we can commit to religious beliefs, even though 
we don’t know if they are true.
Some will object to his argument so far on the grounds that all moral 
evaluations of the justifiability of religious beliefs ultimately reduce to 
epistemic ones anyway, a view Bishop calls “moral evidentialism” (chap. 
3). This view holds that “people are morally justified in taking beliefs to 
be true in their practical reasoning only if those beliefs are evidentially 
justified” (p. 62). While acknowledging that this view has a long history, 
he rejects it because it fails to appreciate that even though the evidence 
for a belief may be ambiguous, we can still commit to the belief in practi-
cal reasoning. Bishop holds that theistic beliefs are evidentially ambigu-
ous (another crucial claim in his argument), meaning that after centuries 
of debate equally intelligent and well-informed thinkers continue to dis-
agree about how to assess the evidence for and against God’s existence. 
If we accept this, the standard view would therefore entail that theistic 
faith commitment is not morally justified. But another option is avail-
able: the evidential ambiguity of theism is plausible enough to support a 
fideistic alternative.
Before he develops his version of fideism, he considers but rejects two 
attempts that accept the evidential ambiguity of theism yet seek to defend 
the moral justifiability of practical commitment to such beliefs, Reformed 
epistemology and Wittgensteinian fideism (chap. 4). He rejects the parity 
argued for by Reformed epistemologists between perceptual beliefs and 
religious beliefs as a way of avoiding a too liberal view of what might 
count as basic beliefs, noting that there is a doubt about the veridicality 
of religious experiences that does not apply to perceptual experiences. He 
also rejects Plantinga’s externalist epistemology as a satisfactory way of 
justifying religious belief. Plantinga argues that a belief has warrant if it 
is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in an appropriate 
environment according to a design-plan successfully aimed at truth. This 
approach only succeeds in showing, Bishop argues (rightly in my view), 
that “if theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that it does have warrant” 
(p. 93). But this appears to be question begging because it does not follow 
that theistic belief actually has warrant. Bishop also raises a familiar prob-
lem about Wittgensteinian fideism, that it runs into problems of justifica-
tion (and indeed relativism) because it cannot justify why we should com-
mit to a language-game in the first place. It does not deal effectively with 
the question of whether a whole language-game, with all of its internal 
criteria, could be mistaken. So neither of these views can show that, in the 
face of evidential ambiguity, commitment to theism is morally justified.
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At this point, Bishop appeals to William James to explore whether 
or not “doxastic venture” is justifiable (chap. 5). A doxastic venture is 
where we take it to be true in practical reasoning that God exists while 
recognizing that the total evidence available does not support the truth 
that God exists (but, crucially, we do believe that God exists). He offers 
Kierkegaard’s, and, somewhat more controversially, Paul Tillich’s views 
as examples of doxastic venture. This kind of venture is possible, Bish-
op argues, appealing to James, because it can be based on non-evidential 
causes, i.e., on passional causes (such as emotions, wishes and desires, 
affiliations, and so on). One of the problems facing this argument is that 
it is too vague on what the passional causes are, and on how they can 
motivate one to a rational belief. Bishop gives the example of a person 
who is passionally caused to hold it true that God exists because of “be-
ing formed or moved by encounter with a theistic religious tradition” (p. 
116). Because of this, she has the psychic resources to commit to belief in 
God, even though she also holds that the belief lacks evidential support. 
But again, is this a convincing example? What exactly is the passional 
cause? It must be something other than a culturally produced desire to 
participate in a tradition. Even though it is true that she might have the 
psychic resources to believe, it does not follow that her belief should not 
be epistemically justified. Don’t we have to show that passional causes 
are rationally acceptable, in which case we are back where we started, 
or failing this, that passional causes do not need to be rational, and how 
could we show that?
Bishop develops (chaps. 6 and 7) James’ argument to tease out the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions that would justify this kind of doxastic 
venture. He holds that such a venture must satisfy these conditions: the 
proposition p must be a “genuine option,” (in James’ words, one that is 
“living, forced and momentous”), and must be one which cannot be de-
cided by its nature on intellectual grounds (a stronger requirement than 
James,’ which was that the evidence did not clearly point one way or the 
other). Bishop argues that theistic belief satisfies these conditions, while 
acknowledging that the conditions commit him to moral pluralism about 
faith ventures in particular (and perhaps also moral relativism?), but 
thinks he can head off the worry about his view being too liberal in allow-
ing morally pernicious faith ventures by insisting on a further condition: 
“that p’s being true conforms with correct morality” (p. 165).
There are two problems with this latter condition. The first is that a sin-
cerely believing Nazi could believe he was satisfying “correct morality.” 
Bishop acknowledges this but points out that he would still be wrong on 
the basis of objective morality, and notes that it is a problem all world-
views must face. The second problem, however, is more complex. This is 
the problem that in order to form true beliefs about correct morality we 
would have to develop our moral values independently of our religion, a 
view that divorces morality from religion, and that assumes moral values 
are not similarly evidentially ambiguous (and so would not require their 
own “doxastic venture”). Bishop does not give this question sufficient at-
tention, but he argues that Abraham’s trusting the message from the angel 
as he was about to sacrifice Isaac is a paradigm case of applying the re-
quirement that faith ventures should conform to correct morality.
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Bishop further defends this fideistic view in concluding chapters by 
arguing that commitment to faith ventures understood in this way is jus-
tified as long as one goes beyond, but not contrary to, the evidence. We 
are still responsible for looking at whatever evidence is available, and for 
holding consistent and coherent beliefs. His view therefore is a robust 
fideism that places genuinely objective conditions on morally permissible 
faith-ventures; yet this shows only that fideism is undefeated, not that it is 
established. Therefore the debate with hard line evidentialist approaches 
(which insist that we should withhold assent to religious beliefs) ends in 
an impasse, in the sense that neither evidentialism nor fideism is estab-
lished. Bishop also warns correctly against the temptation to adopt a hard 
line evidentialist view because one is antecedently committed to natural-
ism, in which case one is in the same boat as the fideist. His final word is 
that the impasse may have to be solved politically, and vaguely suggests 
that some Rawlsian view might be the right way to do this (p. 213). This is 
a disappointing conclusion, given that the Rawlsian approach is generally 
inhospitable to religion, and that it would require us to decide in advance 
of the debate between religion and secularism what can count as properly 
belonging in the debate.
The implications of Bishop’s fideistic view are a moral pluralism, thus 
a rejection of religious exclusivism; also rejection of any view that holds 
that the question of theistic faith beliefs must be settled before we can es-
tablish a theory of “correct morality”; it also might entail the rejection of 
all classical views of God on the grounds that correct morality could rule 
out the traditional God on the basis of the existence of evil. In general, our 
(individual?) accounts of “correct morality” will define what can count as 
acceptable religious beliefs on this view. Although Bishop’s argument is 
sophisticated, complex and carefully developed, it faces some clear diffi-
culties, especially concerning whether one should commit to a belief with-
out adequate evidence, about relativism, and about whether we should 
accept the evidential ambiguity of theism in our personal beliefs (as dis-
tinct from settling the matter in our own minds, while recognizing that, 
as on many subjects, others may come to a different conclusion). Despite 
these misgivings, his attempt to defend a modest, but robust, fideism is 
one of the most interesting in recent times.
God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Argu-
ments, by Yujin Nagasawa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Pp. 162. $85.00 (Cloth).
T. J. MAWSON, University of Oxford
This is a very well-written and clear book, one which brings together ‘knowl-
edge arguments’ from the fields of the philosophy of mind and the philoso-
phy of religion for instructive ‘parallel processing’ and fruitful interplay.
It is divided into four parts. In part one, Nagasawa considers the concep-
tual background to knowledge arguments: “Knowledge arguments attempt 
to transform, via alchemical processes, the base metal of epistemological pre-
